A rogue, agenda driven, judge in Massachusetts finds that “Assault Weapons” and “Large Capacity Magazines” can be banned because the Supreme Court didn’t thing “common use” through.
And besides, they are dangerous, so they can be banned.
Just skimming through the first part, which for the most part is the background of the case, the following sticks out
—Capen v. Campbell, No. 1:22-cv-11431, slip op., n. 3 (D. Mass.)
It is always a sign of a rogue court when they find a reason to use “assault weapon”. This is worsened because they cite to a First Circuit court case from 2019, before Bruen.
The court then correctly cites Winter for the factors in granting a preliminary injunction. The takeaway, for me, is that they cite to Ryan v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t,974 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2020) as the First Circuit’s Winter equivalent.
The gist of both Winter and Ryan v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement is that the court needs to evaluate if the movant is likely to prevail on the merits. Both cases say that if the movant is not likely to win on the merits, that is where the court should stop.
The twisting and turning begins
—id. at 5
When reading citations from rogue judges, it is imperative to verify every claim they make. They will lie by omission, and they will lie with false emphasis.
Here is the paragraph from Heller immediately preceding the court’s citation:
—District of Columbia v. Heller, 467 U.S. 837, 581 (2008)
The Supreme Court has given the definition of “arms” here. “Weapons of offence or armor of defense” and “anything a man wears for his defense or takes into his hands to strike at another” (language cleaned, see above for original).
In Miller the Supreme Court looked at text, history, and tradition, and found that the NFA was constitutional, as applied to short barreled shotguns because short barreled shotguns were not designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity.
So Heller continued:
—id. at 581–82
This is the paragraph the court pulled from. His interpretation of the pulled passage does not match mine. Nor do I think it matches what the Supreme Court meant. This paragraph seems to be telling the inferior courts that Miller‘s limitation to military weapons was not the correct understanding of “arms”.
To make that clearer to the inferior courts, Heller continued:
—id. at 582
I suppose that if one is myopic enough, blinded by their agenda, they could pick out the sentence that can be misinterpreted and omit the clear statement.
And you have to love it when they hide language from a dissent.
—Muscarello V. United States, 141 L. Ed. 2d 111, 142–43 (1998) Justice Ginsburg, dissenting
This is the cite in Heller.
We think that Justice Ginsburg accurately captured the natural meaning of “bear arms.” Although the phrase implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose of “offensive or defensive action,” it in no way connotes participation in a structured military organization.—Heller, 467 U.S. at 584.
This rogue court has totally missed the target. Of course, he wasn’t aiming at the target, his goal was to miss.
It’s not unlimited!!!!
—id. at 595
We have heard this for every infringement offered up by every legislator intent on stomping on the rights of The People. We hear it repeated by the state so often we just shake our heads in disgust, move on to the next stupid thing the infringers are going to say.
Let’s take a moment to look at some operative clauses in this passage. How about
Before turning to limitations upon the individual right?
This seems to indicate that this passage does not stand on its own. There is clarifying language to follow.
How about the
speak for any purpose? It would seem to indicate that there are purposes for which speech can be limited. There is. Defamation is illegal. So is libel and slander.
There are also limits on inciting violence. Those purposes can cause the speech to fall outside the protections of the First Amendment.
Applying the same logic to “
carry arms for any sort of confrontation“? What could that mean?
How about carrying your arms to commit murder? That seems to be a purpose that falls outside the protection of the Second Amendment. So would “going armed to the terror of the people.” This is the act of intentional terrorizing the people.
A bunch of cowboys riding into town with rifles and pistols holstered is not “going armed to the terror of the people”. Having the same cowboys ride into town with rifles and pistols in hand, pointing them at people, is terrorizing the people.
Going armed to the terror of the people certainly does not mean having a pistol concealed on your person that nobody sees.
So what did the Heller Court say about the limitations on individuals’ protected right to keep and bear arms?
—id. at 626–27
Ok, in Heller they said that nothing in Heller
cast[s] doubt Interestingly, while they support §922(g)(1) and §922(g)(4), they said nothing about §922(g)(2,3,5,6,7,8, or 9). Now isn’t that interesting to consider in light of so many cases challenging §922(g)(3), §922(g)(8), and §922(g)(9).
—id. at 627
Weapons in common use at the time are protected. There is a tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”
This is the core of Heller.
It gets better:
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause.
If I’m reading this correctly, every one of those infringing fascists that claim that weapons that are most useful in military service can be banned, because of what Heller said, have had to pull the quote out of context.
It may be objected is saying that other might say this. It is not saying we are saying it. This would be the equivalent of somebody saying that AWA said, “assault weapons can be banned” because I quoted some rogue judge as saying those words.
Back to the nonsense the district court spouted
—#62 Capen v. Campbell, No. 1:22-cv-11431, slip op. at 6
There is a complete section in Heller that discusses the limitations of the Second Amendment. It starts halfway down page 626. While the words cited are in the opinion, it is not part of the Supreme Court’s discussion on the limitations of the Second Amendment.
The Courts “basic Principles”
—id. at 12
This is an amazingly complex way of inverting the logic of Heller. Instead of saying, “firearms may not be regulated if they are in common use today”, the court used the negative form, multiple times.
“May be regulated” “not in common use” “not typically possessed by” are all negatives. This is meant to confuse the reader and hide a logic error.
In logic, there is DeMorgan’s Law. It explains how to negate a logic expression. If Miguel is armed AND J.Kb. is armed AND AWA is armed THEN all are armed. END.
What if we wanted to invert that logic. “If NOT (M == A AND J == A AND AWA == A) THEN all are unarmed END”. That might be difficult to read, so we expanded it.
IF NOT M==A AND NOT J == A AND NOT AWA == A THEN all are unarmed END. is incorrect. It looks right but it not. The correct version is “NOT M==A OR NOT J == A OR NOT AWA == A”.
This judge is using those negative statements to slip in “or because they are dangerous and unusual weapons”
We need to be on our guard now.
This is another profound error by this rogue judge. There is nothing in any of Heller, McDonald, Caetano, or Bruen that suggests that the Second Amendment should be analyzed differently for rifles than for handguns.
The under pinning of his abuse of The People
—id. at 13
It has only led to confusion when a rogue court wants to allow abuses of the rights of The People.
Heller analyzed the language of the Second Amendment to put shut the lie that the Second Amendment only applied to Militias. The state argued that the Second only applied to militias. The common militias had all been banned or become part of the National Guard. The National Guard was under the control of the state.
Thus, the only entity that had standing to challenge a regulation on Second Amendment grounds was the Militia, i.e., the state.
The Heller Court then confirmed the methodology of Miller, that you first look to the plain text of the Second Amendment, then to history and tradition.
Finally, they used text, history, and tradition to analyze the question before them, D.C.’s ban on handguns.
As part of that analysis of the handgun ban, they did all the heavy lifting and found that arms in common use today cannot be banned.
I call this the Heller shortcut.
If we are considering a ban of an arm, the inferior court need only ask, “Is this arm in common use today?” If the answer is “Yes”, then the case is finished, with the ban being found unconstitutional.
If the answer is “no”, then the Government has the burden of proving a history and tradition supporting their modern regulation.
—id. at 13–14
Well, that is what the Heller Court said. Then in Caetano the Supreme court put an upper limit on the number of arms in circulation to be considered “in common use today” at 200,000. If there are more than 200,000 of an arm in use by The People for lawful purposes, it is protected by the Second Amendment.
—id. at 14
This is just plain duplicitous. There are certainly more than 200,000 smooth-bore, muzzle-loading muskets in common use today. Just one site I visited showed that they had sold over 10,000 muzzle loaders.
There are dozens, if not hundreds, of companies that are producing and selling muzzle-loading firearms. I own a couple.
They are in common use today, for lawful purposes. Regardless of what this deceitful judge says.
Kolbe is under review by the Fourth Circuit court. The Supreme Court GVRed a case that depended on Kolbe, Kolbe is bad case law, the infringers have just not acknowledged it yet.
The state does not get to decide, a priori, that an arm is too dangerous for The People.
This judge is saying, explicitly, that the “in common use today” method can’t be used because the government couldn’t respond rapidly enough to ban new arms before they were protected.
Finally, that proposed application of a “common use” standard would effectively ignore an important underpinning of Bruen: that the meaning of the Second Amendment should be grounded in text, history, and tradition, not shifting modern attitudes, and that its protection should be categorical. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 79 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Friedman is an abysmal case out of the Fourth Circuit that is currently being challenged. It is the Seventh Circuit’s equivalent of the Fourth Circuit’s Kolbe. Additionally, the Supreme Court has opinions that refute that circular argument. The reality is that a state can ban something based on it being uncommon, when it is uncommon because the state has banned it.
And with that final paragraph, this inferior court shows why this judge is using inferior logic. “In common use today” is the shortcut. That shortcut has done the text, history, and tradition analysis for the imbeciles that can’t follow instructions.
Hey Dennis, put the paste down, you know you aren’t supposed to be eating it. And no, you shouldn’t eat the Crayons. It will make the Marines upset if you eat their treats. Now Dennis, pay attention, eyes on me. What’s 2 + 2? If you don’t know, remember it is up on the wall.
Hey Judge Dennis Saylor, the answer is posted on the wall. If it is in common use today than it can’t be banned.