Case Analysis

In their own words

When you read court opinions, it is sometimes hard going. I use the term “emotional blackmail” to describe the type of argument which is based on feels instead of facts.

The children will die if you don’t… Women will die in back alley abortions if you… People will solve disagreements in bloody gun fights if you…

It reminds me of the teacher who once told me that she was terrified of people having a gun in the school. If she said something bad about their precious child, the parent might snap and shoot her. If a parent is willing to murder her for her attitude, why aren’t they beating the crap out of her now?

In —Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____ (2023) all the concurring opinions start with facts. I have only double-checked Roberts’ opinion written for the court. When the liberals start their opinions, it is about goals. They want to reach a particular goal, and they tell you why that goal is good, and you should just do “the right thing” without letting that pesky constitution get in the way.
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United States v. Rahimi Petition for writ of certiorari

Recap

Prior to the Bruen opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case of United States V. Rahimi.
On June 8, 2022, just a few weeks before the Bruen opinion, the Circuit court affirmed Mr. Rahimi’s convection.

A federal grand jury indicted Rahimi for possession of firearms in violation of sections 922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2).1 Later, Rahimi pleaded guilty. At sentencing, the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) detailed Rahimi’s lengthy criminal history. Relevant to this appeal are the state charges that were pending against him for offenses that occurred from December 2019 to November 2020. Three pending state charges resulted from Rahimi’s use of a firearm in the physical assault of his girlfriend in December 2019,2 and another state charge arose from an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of a different woman in November 2020. Rahimi objected to the PSR, arguing that the pending charges described relevant conduct to the instant offense such that the sentence for the instant federal offense should be ordered to run concurrently to the state sentences. The district court overruled the objection, adopted the PSR, and ordered the federal sentence to run consecutively to the pending charges because they were not relevant conduct. Rahimi appeals, arguing that the district court clearly erred by concluding the pending charges were not relevant conduct.

1) Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that section 922(g)(8) on its face violates the Second Amendment and the district court denied the motion. Rahimi appeals this decision but acknowledges that it is foreclosed by our finding precedent. United States v. McGinnis, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1397 (2021).
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____ (2023)

Briefly, Rahimi was a bad dude, doing bad things. When he was arrested, he had a firearm. He had not been convicted of a crime. Along with all the state level charges brought against him, he was also charged as a prohibited person in possession of a firearm under §922(g)(8) and §924(a)(2).

The Circuit court had already ruled in 2020 on the exact question.

We again confront a Second Amendment challenge to a federal law prohibiting individuals subject to certain domestic violence protective orders from possessing firearms or ammunition for any purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Appellant Eric McGinnis, convicted by a jury of violating § 922(g)(8), claims the statute is a facially unconstitutional restriction on his right to keep and bear arms. This court rejected a virtually identical challenge two decades ago in Judge Garwood’s landmark decision in United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001). Much has changed in Second Amendment jurisprudence since then, and so we consider whether § 922(g)(8) still passes muster under our contemporary framework. It does.

Separately, McGinnis argues his conviction should be vacated because his protective order does not track the requirements of § 922(g)(8). He also asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing a written special condition of supervised release not orally pronounced at sentencing. We affirm the conviction but remand for the limited purpose of conforming McGinnis’s written judgment to the district court’s oral pronouncement.
id.

Because of this earlier case, Rahimi’s case wasn’t a foregone conclusion.

And then there was Bruen

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How to hide the lead, 2nd Cir. and 3rd Cir.

Back in December 2022 in the case of Antonyuk v. Hochul the state didn’t like the District Court enjoining the New York State CCIA. New York’s Bruen spam response law.

Appellants request a stay pending appeal of the district court’s order dated November 7, 2022 (N.D.N.Y. 22-cv-986, doc. 78), enjoining Appellants from enforcing certain aspects of New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (“CCIA”). Having weighed the applicable factors, see In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007), we conclude that a stay pending appeal is warranted. Accordingly, upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion for a stay pending appeal is GRANTED and the district court’s November 7 order is STAYED pending the resolution of this appeal. To the extent that the district court’s order bars enforcement of the CCIA’s provisions related to persons who have been tasked with the duty to keep the peace at places of worship, airports, and private buses, such categories are EXCEPTED
from this order. Appellees’ motion to expedite the resolution of the matter is GRANTED.
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____ (2023)

This is the entirety of the order granting the stay. This was in response to 180+ pages that the District Court wrote explaining why the CCIA was a crap law and that the state was likely to lose on the merits.

The entire explanation exists somewhere on page 170 of a 2007 2nd Cir. Opinion.

Digging down the rabbit hole, we find:

The four factors to be considered in issuing a stay pending appeal are well known: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;[1] (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1987); see Cooper v. Town of East Hampton, 83 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir.1996). We have applied these same factors in considering whether to vacate a stay. See Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.2002). We have also noted that the degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning that “`more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.'” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Mohammed, 309 F.3d at 101).

Having heard the interlocutory appeal after full briefing, we are in a position to evaluate the Appellants’ probability of success in a more focused way than could the motions panel. Although we are not prepared at this time to resolve all of the many issues arising on the merits of the appeal, we can conclude that there is now a lesser probability than might have previously appeared that the Appellants will succeed in preventing at least some of the Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed into at least the discovery stage of the litigation.

The second factor — irreparable injury to the stay applicants — remains the same as before: any proceedings in the District Court pending appeal will irreparably impair, at least to some extent, their alleged claim to immunity from suit. The third factor substantial injury to the parties opposing the stay has increased in significance with the passage of time since among the Plaintiffs are many people with life-threatening injuries, some of whom have died since the litigation began.

This effect of the passage of time upon the Plaintiffs’ interests also has a bearing on the public interest, which is to be considered as the fourth factor, although there are public interest considerations on both sides. On the one hand, there is a public interest in having any of the Plaintiffs who might be entitled to recovery receive compensation while still living and able to use it to cover medical costs and improve the quality of their lives. On the other hand, there is a public interest in vindicating the immunity of any of the Defendants who might be entitled to immunity from suit. At this point, we cannot predict whether any Plaintiffs will ultimately obtain compensation if immunity from suit is not available to the Defendants, nor are we prepared to adjudicate the jurisdictional challenges and immunity claims without a thorough consideration of the substantial issues presented to us. Nevertheless, a decision whether to maintain the stay must be made. On balance, we conclude that the public interest favors permitting pretrial proceedings to resume, *171 thereby hastening the trial that might result in compensation for at least some Plaintiffs during their lifetimes, even though that course will impose upon the Defendants the burdens of pretrial discovery, thereby denying them immunity from suit during the interval from now until such time as it might ultimately be determined that their claims for immunity from suit are valid.
id.

The first paragraph in the quote is the standard reasons for why an injunction is granted because that is the same reason for a stay to be granted stopping an injunction.

we can conclude that there is now a lesser probability than might have previously appearedDred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US 393 (Supreme Court 1857) That wording, applied to the Antonyuk reads like “we know better than the District Court because we said so.”

It also seems to say that the question of irreparable injury fails. While we know that any constitutional right denied is an irreparable injury, the courts have often balanced the Second Amendment injury away. In the Court’s mind, it is better for a gun owner to be denied their rights than to have the state’s legislation enjoined.

Finally, it seems to say that a delay is not really a problem because “PEOPLE WILL DIE IF THIS LAW ISN’T ALLOWED TO STAY IN PLACE!!!”

The point being, that we had to dig into a different opinion and need to guess at what the 2nd Circuit Court’s reasoning is. Because we are guessing, it is much more difficult to say “you are wrong” when taken up by the Supreme Court.

In addition, in the cited case, World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, the 2nd Circuit did not actually cite to the Supreme Court. All of their citations, in the quoted work, are back to themselves. Or, as my mother said on more than one occasion, “If I’ve told you once, I’ve told you a thousand times.” That doesn’t mean her reasoning was any better this time than it was in the previous 999 times.

If we needed to know more about the reasoning, we would have to go read those other opinions.

We see the same sort of general waving of hands in Koons v. Platkin. The Court’s entire reasoning is expressed as as we conclude the applicable factors warrant such a stay, see In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2015)Roe V. Wade, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). We have to look at the cited opinion and then guess at what words out of that page were being used to justify this stay.

The Sliding-Scale Approach to Balancing the Stay Factors

Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007, a party can move to stay the effect of a bankruptcy court order pending a resolution on appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8007. The factors considered “overlap” the familiar ones courts look to in ruling on applications for preliminary injunctions. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009) (observing that “similar concerns arise whenever a court order may allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that action has been conclusively determined”). To repeat essentially what was already noted above, the following factors come into play:

  1. whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits;
  2. whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
  3. whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and
  4. where the public interest lies.
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____

We see the same language as the 2nd Circuit Court used, that’s because it is common across all jurisdictions. Guessing makes me think that where the public interest lies might hold more weight with the Court.

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987). In order not to ignore the many gray shadings stay requests present, courts “balance[e] them all” and “consider the relative strength of the four factors.” Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 538 (8th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 16A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3954 (4th ed. 2008) (“The four factors should be balanced; thus, for example, if the balance of harms tips heavily enough in the stay applicant’s favor then the showing of likelihood of success need not be as strong, and vice versa.” (footnotes omitted)).
id.

Here, the 3rd Circuit brings up “balance” multiple times. This almost always results in the court balancing rights away.

“[T]he most critical” factors, according to the Supreme Court, Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749, are the first two: whether the stay movant has demonstrated (1) a strong showing of the likelihood of success and (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm — the latter referring to “harm that cannot be prevented or fully rectified” by a successful appeal, Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir.1984) (Posner, J.). Though both are necessary, the former is arguably the more important piece of the stay analysis. As Judge Posner has remarked, it isn’t enough that the failure to obtain a stay will be “a disaster” for the stay movant but only a “minor inconvenience to the defendant,” as “[e]quity jurisdiction exists only to remedy legal wrongs; [thus,] without some showing of a probable right[,] there is no basis for invoking it.” Id. at 387.
U.S. Senate: Freedmen’s Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866, (last visited Jul. 2, 2023)

As I dig through this litigation, I find that concerns that we have about Second Amendment Rights are echoed by other groups, and we see the same sorts of things happening. I don’t know anything about the case cited here. What I find interesting is that the Court pulled a small amount of text from a Supreme Court Opinion, Nken but then turned to the 7th Circuit Court to find an interpretation of those words that this Court approves of.

It appears that the Court is saying that winning on the merits is more important than the harm being caused to either party. That sounds good…

And finally, For our Court, a sufficient degree of success for a strong showing exists if there is “a reasonable chance, or probability, of winning.” Thus, while it “is not enough that the chance of success on the merits be `better than negligible,'”, the likelihood of winning on appeal need not be “more likely than not,”Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____ internal citations omitted.

The Third Circuit Court doesn’t think there is a high enough probability of the plaintiffs winning to allow the injunction to remain in place. They believe that the sensitive places language of Chapter 131 will be found constitutional.

Bibliography

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US 393 (Supreme Court 1857)
Roe V. Wade, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973)
United States v. Rahimi, 61 F. 4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023)
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____ (2023)
U.S. Senate: Freedmen’s Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866, (last visited Jul. 2, 2023)

Update on Ronald Koons v. Attorney General New Jersey (23-1900)

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered an expedited briefing schedule. The original order was Appellants’ opening brief and the joint appendix must be filed on or before July 7, 2023; Appellees’ briefs must be filed on or before August 4, 2023; Appellants’ reply brief, if any, must be filed on or before August 18, 2023. The Court intends to schedule the appeal for disposition during the week of September 11, 2023Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____ (2023) The state asked to have it delayed, and the new briefing schedule is Appellants/Cross-Appellees and Intervenors shall file their opening briefs and the joint appendix on or before July 20, 2023; Appellees/Cross-Appellants shall file their opening/response brief on or before August 10, 2023; Appellees’ shall file their response brief on or before August 21, 2023; Appellants/Cross-Appellees and Intervenors shall file their response/reply briefs on or before September 4, 2023; and Appellees/Cross-Appellants shall file their reply brief on or before September 18, 2023id.

In the meantime, the Circuit court has stayed parts of the injunction: The requested stay is GRANTED as to the preliminary injunction of N.J. Stat. Ann. Section:Section: 2C:58-4.6(a)(6), (a)(9), (a)(10), (a)(12), (a)(15), (a)(17), (a)(18), (a)(21), as we conclude the applicable factors warrant such a stayDred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US 393 (Supreme Court 1857)

What does that mean? It means that the following places are still “sensitive” places where carrying firearms is verboten.

  1. within 100 feet of a place where a public gathering, demonstration or event is held for which a government permit is required, during the conduct of such gathering, demonstration or event;
  2. a nursery school, pre-school, zoo, or summer camp;
  3. a park, beach, recreation facility or area or playground owned or controlled by a State, county or local government unit, or any part of such a place, which is designated as a gun-free zone by the governing authority based on considerations of public safety;
  4. a publicly owned or leased library or museum;
  5. a bar or restaurant where alcohol is served, and any other site or facility where alcohol is sold for consumption on the premises;
  6. a privately or publicly owned and operated entertainment facility within this State, including but not limited to a theater, stadium, museum, arena, racetrack or other place where performances, concerts, exhibits, games or contests are held;
  7. a casino and related facilities, including but not limited to appurtenant hotels, retail premises, restaurant and bar facilities, and entertainment and recreational venues located within the casino property;
  8. a health care facility, including but not limited to a general hospital, special hospital, psychiatric hospital, public health center, diagnostic center, treatment center, rehabilitation center, extended care facility, skilled nursing home, nursing home, intermediate care facility, tuberculosis hospital, chronic disease hospital, maternity hospital, outpatient clinic, dispensary, assisted living center, home health care agency, residential treatment facility, residential health care facility, medical office, or ambulatory care facility;
Roe V. Wade, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973)

Bibliography

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US 393 (Supreme Court 1857)
Roe V. Wade, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973)
United States v. Rahimi, 61 F. 4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023)
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____ (2023)
U.S. Senate: Freedmen’s Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866, (last visited Jul. 2, 2023)

Matthew Hoover’s Motion for Acquittal

B.L.U.F.Matthew Hoover and Kristopher Ervin thumbed their noses at the ATF, daring the ATF to do something. The ATF did, they arrested both of them for multiple counts of conspiracy to sell a “combination of parts” that would convert a gun into a machine gun. Both were found Guilty. They have not been sentenced yet. Having been found guilty, both are asking for the court to acquit them.


Hard cases make good law. There is so much tied up in this case that it is hard to dissect. This might be such a case.

History

Matthew Hoover was a YouTuber who created gun content. I had watched some of his videos, but his content wasn’t of significant interest to me. His content would be recommended to me from time to time. At some point, he started advertising the “Auto Key Card” and it was obvious that he was selling this card.

The “Auto Key Card” was a dimensionally correct etching on a stainless-steel card of a “lighting link.” A lighting link can convert an AR-15 style platform from semi-automatic to full-automatic, i.e. a machine gun.

But what does it do? It is both complicated and simple at the same time.


On the AR-15 platform, when you have charged the rifle, you have cocked the internal hammer. The hammer has a small notch in it called a sear.

When you press the trigger, the arm in front of the trigger rotates down. As it does, it clears the sear on the hammer. The hammer then moves forward to hit the firing pin and fire the weapon.

The bullet flies down the barrel, as it passes the gas port some of the gas is diverted into the gas tube. That gas flows back towards the receiver, where it acts on the bolt carrier to shove the bolt carrier towards the rear of the gun. The bolt carrier pulls the bolt out of the chamber. It also pushes the hammer back down.

This happens so fast that you do not have time to release the trigger. As the bolt carrier is shoved forward by the recoil spring, the hammer rides down the back of the bolt carrier and may or may not drive the firing pin into the next round, firing git.

The disconnector interrupts this process. The hook at the front of the disconnector catches the hook on the back inside the hammer and keeps the hammer from following the bolt forward.

When the trigger is released, the nose comes up and is ready to catch the hammer. As the trigger is released more, the disconnector is pulled back out of the hook on the hammer and the hammer starts forward, only to be stopped as the sear catches on the nose of the trigger.

We are now ready for the next trigger press.

In a full auto AR-15 platform, we add one more piece and modify some of the other pieces. The first piece of interest is the selector switch. This will push down on the back of the disconnector, so its hook will never catch the hammer hook. If this was all that was happening, the hammer would ride the bolt carrier back down and the firearm might slam fire. But this is not controlled and might not actually happen.

What we want to have happen is for the hammer to stay back until the bolt is in battery and then for the hammer to fall, picking up speed, until it strikes the back of the firing pin. This is where the auto sear comes into play.

When the bolt carrier to the rear, the hammer is down and the auto sear is rotated such that it catches the hook on the back of the hammer. This holds the hammer down as the bolt carrier moves forward, driving the bolt into battery. As this happens, the back of the bolt carrier catches the rear of the auto sear and rotates it. This releases the hammer, allowing the gun to fire a second time.

The thing that makes an AR-15 receiver a “machine gun” is the little hole for the auto sear pivot pin. Without that hole and the auto sear, it is not a machine gun.

Before 1986, people were manufacturing “drop in auto sear” This was a block of milled steel with the auto sear and pivot pin integral to the unit. When put into a receiver with a correctly milled shelf for the auto sear and when the rest of the fire control group had the right type of disconnector, trigger, selector switch, and hammer, the drop in auto sear worked just like a normal auto sear.

If that little chuck of metal was properly serialized and registered before 1986, it is legally a machine gun. They sell for thousands of dollars.

A cheap version of the drop in auto sear was the “lighting link”. This was a much simpler device made from a couple of pieces of thin stamped metal. It performed the same function. Unfortunately, it wasn’t very reliable. They had to be carefully tuned to fit a particular receiver and even then, it couldn’t be trusted the same way a real M-16 and drop in auto-sears could.

Dimensional draws of the lighting link are available on the internet and in some old tyme books.

All of this brings us back to the Auto Key Card. The Auto Key Card is a dimensional drawing of a lighting link. The card is made from stainless-steel and is laser etched. That is all it is.

The Question

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O.F.F. et al. v. Brown — Update and analysis

B.L.U.F. Trial is held, state asks for a Judgement


Recent History

On June 1, 2023, the judge revised his order and granted the defendants (bad guys) motion to dismiss as-applied challenges to Ballot Measure 114. The state argued, and the court found persuasive, that since the permitting provisions are not implemented yet, there is no violation. The plaintiffs (good guys) are allowed to refile once the permitting provisions are actually implemented.

There are two types of challenges, “as-applied” and “facial”

A facial challenge contends that a government law, rule, regulation, or policy is unconstitutional as written — that is, on its face. This challenge differs from an as-applied challenge in that it invalidates a law for everyone — not just as that law is applied to the particular litigant challenging it.
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____ (2023)

The Court’s order says that there is no violation of the plaintiffs’ rights because nothing has happened. To use a different type of example, consider a suspect that is being interviewed regarding a crime. He asks for a lawyer, but the cops keep asking him questions.

There is no constitutionality issue regarding the police interviewing suspects. If the suspect challenges that there is a constitutional issue, it is only his rights that were violated, not yours, not mine. This would be an “as-applied” case.

As-applied cases normally do not have far-reaching implications. On the other hand, sometimes they do: —id.

The other side of the coin is the “facial” challenge. In a facial challenge, the entire law or regulation can be found to be unconstitutional. This is one of the issues the government is arguing in —Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US 393 (Supreme Court 1857). Rahimi was convicted for being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. He had a domestic violence restraining order against him, which made him a prohibited person.

Rahimi’s lawyers made a facial challenge against —Roe V. Wade, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). The 5th Cir. found for Rahimi. The state would like this to be an “as-applied” because that would mean it the ruling doesn’t extend to anybody else.

The Question

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Viramontes v. The County of Cook, AWB county reply


B.L.U.F. Cook County tells the court that modern sporting rifles aren’t arms, and other fairy tales.


Plaintiffs cannot establish that Assault Weapons are “arms” protected by the Second Amendment.

You know it will be a chuckle fest when the state starts their argument with such an absurd claim.

Plaintiffs’ definition of arms is overbroad. They define arms as “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (internal quotations omitted). But Bruen adds to this definition, specifically acknowledging a self-defense component: “Thus, even though the Second Amendment’s definition of ‘arms’ is fixed according to its historical understanding, the general definition covers modern instruments that facilitate self-defense.” Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2117. The phrase “facilitate self-defense” is a conditional limitation on the definition of arms. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot bypass step one by simply proclaiming all bearable arms are protected.
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. ____ (2023)

Off the rails they go

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