awa

When A Rogue Court Proves They Are Disingenuous

Part of the Heller methodology is the use of text, history, and tradition of regulations.

Not discussions, not proposed laws, not policy, but actual regulations. That is, laws passed by the legislatures of the state or federal government.

Today, it is pretty easy to gather the current laws. It is more difficult to get historical records. “The Court House burned down.” isn’t just an excuse, it actually happened, in several places.

Remember that in the war of 1812, the British marched into Washington, D.C. and burned large parts of it.

So what is a rogue court and an infringing state to do when they can’t find a regulation to match their proposed infringement?

Find somebody who made it up!

Item, it is enacted, that no man great nor small, of what condition soever he be, except the King’s servants in his presence, and his Ministers in executing of the King’s precepts, of of their office, and such as be in their company assisting them, and also upon a cry made for arms to keep the peace, and the same in such places where such acts happen, be so hardy to come before the King’s justices, or other of the King’s Ministers doing their office with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets nor in the presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, nor it [sic, likely “in”] no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the King’s pleasure. And that the King’s Justices in their presence, Sheriffs and other ministers in their bailiwicks, Lords of Franchises, and their bailiffs in the same, and Mayors and Bailiffs of cities and boroughs, within the same cities and boroughs, and boroughholders, constables and wardens of the peace within their wards shall have power to execute this etc. [in original] And that the Justices assigned, at thier coming down into the country, shall have power to enquire how such officers and lords have exercised their offices in this case, and to punish them whom they find that have not done that which pertain to their office.
Francois Xavier Martin, A Collection of Statutes of the Parliament of England in Force in the State of North Carolina, 60-61 (Newbern 1792) | Duke Center for Firearms LawDuke Center for Firearms Law, (last visited Dec. 16, 2023)

The quote was taken from the Duke Center for Firearms Law web page.

Something stands out in that “law,” claiming to be from 1792. I couldn’t put my finger on it, but our readers are much sharper than I am.

My memory is pretty poor, but I seem to remember that the American Revelation ended September 3, 1783. The author of this piece of “history” wants us to believe that nearly a decade later, North Caroline was still referring to the “King” and “Lords”?

This “regulation” does not pass the sniff test. I believe it to be fabricated. When it was fabricated, I do not know. But for the Second Circuit court to depend on it indicates that they did not treat their job seriously.

The Second Circuit then cites to —1786 Va. Acts 35. (Ch. 49, An Act Forbidding and Punishing Affrays). | Duke Center for Firearms LawDuke Center for Firearms Law, (last visited Dec. 16, 2023). This should be familiar to the Second Circuit, and to those of us in the Second Amendment Community.

Respondents next direct our attention to three late-18th-century and early-19th-century statutes, but each parallels the colonial statutes already discussed. One 1786 Virginia statute provided that “no man, great nor small, [shall] go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places, in terror of the Country.” Collection of All Such Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia ch. 21, p. 33 (1794).14 A Massachusetts statute from 1795 commanded justices of the peace to arrest “all affrayers, rioters, disturbers, or breakers of the peace, and such as shall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens of this Commonwealth.” 1795 Mass. Acts and Laws ch. 2, p. 436, in Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. And an 1801 Tennessee statute likewise required any person who would “publicly ride or go armed to the terror of the people, or privately carry any dirk, large knife, pistol or any other dangerous weapon, to the fear or terror of any person” to post a surety; otherwise, his continued violation of the law would be “punished as for a breach of the peace, or riot at common law.” 1801 Tenn. Acts pp. 260–261.

A by-now-familiar thread runs through these three statutes: They prohibit bearing arms in a way that spreads “fear” or “terror” among the people. As we have already explained, Chief Justice Holt in Sir John Knight’s Case interpreted this in Terrorem Populi element to require something more than merely carrying a firearm in public. See supra, at 34–35. Respondents give us no reason to think that the founding generation held a different view. Thus, all told, in the century leading up to the Second Amendment and in the first decade after its adoption, there is no historical basis for concluding that the preexisting right enshrined in the Second Amendment permitted broad prohibitions on all forms of public carry.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. V. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 41–42 (U.S. 2022)

In other words, the Supreme Court has already looked at this law and found that it does not support infringements.

A Take down of the Second Circuit Court’s Odious opinion

Legal Case Analysis
B.L.U.F.
In reading some recent filings, I came across this excellent take down of the Second Circuit Court’s opinion.
(1550 words)


The following is mostly from plaintiffs (good guys) in Kipke v. Moore in the District Court of Maryland. As mentioned the other day, the state is using the opinion out of the Second Circuit to bolster their arguments. The plaintiffs are having none of it.

Plaintiffs respectfully submit the following response to Defendants’ Notice of Supplemental Authority. See Notice, Doc. No. 45. Plaintiffs argue that the Second Circuit “rejected the notion that courts should look only to Founding-era laws and traditions.” Id. at 1. The only authorities cited by the Second Circuit are the now-vacated Eleventh Circuit opinion in National Rifle Association v. Bondi, a concurrence from the Third Circuit, and two Circuit court opinions pre-dating Bruen. See Antonyuk v. Chiumento, 2023 WL 8518003, at *16 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2023). Plaintiffs maintain that “the scope of the protection applicable to the Federal Government and States is pegged to the public understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791.” Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2137. The paucity of relevant authority supporting the opposing view only bolsters Plaintiffs’ position. The Second Circuit further erred in suggesting that a different analysis was appropriate “[b]ecause the [New York statute] is a state law.” Antonyuk, 2023 WL 8518003, at *15. Bruen squarely holds that the Second Amendment has “the same scope” against the States as it does against the federal government and thus there can be no different test when it is applied to the States. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2137. See Mem. in Support of Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 11–13, Doc. 24-1 (“MPI”); Pls.’ Reply at 11–12, Doc. 38 (“P. Reply”)
Francois Xavier Martin, A Collection of Statutes of the Parliament of England in Force in the State of North Carolina, 60-61 (Newbern 1792) | Duke Center for Firearms LawDuke Center for Firearms Law, (last visited Dec. 16, 2023)

NRA v. Bondi was the case down in Florida where the 3 judge panel found that 18, 19, and 20-year-olds were not part of “The People”. They published their opinion. Their opinion was immediately stayed by another judge on the Eleventh Circuit court. The case was then taken up en banc.

We are waiting for the en banc panel to issue their opinion.

Citing to NRA v. Bondi as good case law is a profound error. It is no different than citing to —1786 Va. Acts 35. (Ch. 49, An Act Forbidding and Punishing Affrays). | Duke Center for Firearms LawDuke Center for Firearms Law, (last visited Dec. 16, 2023) to support a current regulation. (Dred Scott was an awful Supreme Court opinion that has been corrected by the Supreme Court.)

The Circuit Courts like to think of themselves as Supreme Courts. Even if the Supreme Court has told the Article III inferior courts how to do something, the Circuit Courts, which are inferior courts, will hold on to their past opinions with a stranglehold.

The Forth Circuit court should have had an easy task when asked if Kolbe is still good law. The Supreme Court just GVRed a case to the Fourth, telling them that using Kolbe they got it wrong. Yes, Kolbe is part of the dung heap of the past.

Depending on decisions, pre-dating Bruen is wrong. The problem that these rogue courts have, is that they don’t have any ground to stand on. Every time they think they are on firm ground, it turns to quicksand. They knew they were infringing when they used the means-end tests. They knew they were ignoring what the Supreme Court wanted. They were more concerned with their agenda.

In —New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. V. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 41–42 (U.S. 2022), the Supreme Court clearly stated that the Second Amendment is incorporated. That it applies to the states as well as the Federal government. For the Second Circuit to say that state law is somehow different is an abuse of their authority.
Read More

Friday Feedback

There are numerous cases that are bouncing closer and closer to the Supreme Court. The readers of the tea leaves all agree, the Supreme Court is going to static.

There are people who have spent decades observing the Supreme Court, attempting to predict what they will do in any particular situation. Some of them have great track records, some reaching as high as 50%!

Cases exist in different “states”. Everything before final judgement is interlocutory. This means that the case hasn’t reached a conclusion at this level.

The current spat of infringements being challenged are all in that interlocutory state. The Supreme Court doesn’t normally act on cases that are still interlocutory. They much prefer everything done and ready for them to give an opinion that is going to stick.

So don’t worry when you see the Supreme Court hasn’t done something.

The reloading series is nearing an end, I have a few more articles to write in that series.

If you think there is something I’m missing, please let me know in the comments. I might have it queued up for an article already, or I might have missed it.

For those of you that do progressive reloading, yes, I know it is the cat’s meow. I might touch on it, but I’ve never used a progressive press. I’m not the right person to write that article.

As always, feel free to give us your thoughts in the comments below.

Have a great weekend!

Bevis v. Naperville, (U.S.) 23A486

We have some bad news. The case which was put on the Supreme Court’s emergency docket asking for a writ of injunction has been denied.

The total information we have currently is:
Dec 14 2023 Application (23A486) referred to the Court.
Application (23A486) for a writ of injunction pending certiorari presented to Justice Barrett and by her referred to the Court is denied.

The Cascade of Opinions


B.L.U.F.
A quick update regarding some 2A cases kicking around. Touching on how bad case law begets bad case law.
(1200 words)


In June 2022, the Supreme Court issued the Bruen opinion. This case answered one question: Is New York’s “proper cause” requirement for a CCW constitutional?

The Supreme Court answered with a resounding “NO!”.

In dealing with the question, they stated that subjective criteria was not acceptable. They went on to explain how they reached their opinion using text, history, and tradition. In the associated dicta, they told the Article III inferior courts how they should analyze any Second Amendment challenges.

It is important to understand that the Supreme Court gives explicit answers regarding the question they are answering and instructions on how the inferior courts can do it themselves.

When an inferior court says that the Supreme Court hasn’t issued an opinion on something, that is the court being cowardly, ignorant, or attempting to subvert The Constitution.

If the plaintiffs make a Second Amendment challenge, they are responsible for proving that the proposed conduct implicates the plain text of the Second Amendment.

To take just one example, a 16-year-old wishes to purchase a firearm. They are refused because they are underage.

The text of the Second Amendment reads; A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

The state might argue that 16 year-olds are not part of the people for reasons. But this is not the first step.

The plaintiffs wish to purchase a firearm. All firearms are arms. Thus, the “Arms” requirement is met. They wish to purchase, possess arms. This satisfies “to keep and bear arms”.

They are a part of “the people”. That means the plain text of the Second Amendment is implicated.

If the state starts arguing that they are not part of the people protected by the Second Amendment, that is part of the second step: history and tradition.

Anytime the state is arguing that something is not an arm, or it is not being kept, or it isn’t bearing, or they are not part of the people, they are attempting to subvert the clear intentions of the Supreme Court.

Once the plaintiffs have proved that the proposed conduct implicates the plain text of the Second Amendment, the burden shifts to the state. The plaintiffs are done.

In that second stage, the plaintiffs can argue why particular regulations are not analogous, or not of the correct period. That is their job, to eliminate the regulations presented by the state from being considered.

Everything else the state brings up can be challenged as being irrelevant. If an expert is giving an opinion on legal matters, that is inappropriate. The legal experts are the attorneys and the Court, experts give opinions about non-legal issues.

The First Domino

Read More

Reloading: Measuring – Part 8

(2600 words)

All recipes for charges are given by weight. Normally, to 0.1 grains.

Each powder has a different density and a different required charge.

Powders come in different granule shapes. There are flakes. There are cylinders, formed by pushing wet powder through round holes, then cutting them into small cylinders. Finally, there are spherical granules.

The surface area of a granule is the biggest factor in how fast a given powder burns. The same composition, in different shapes, will burn at different rates.

For each lot of powder, the density for that powder should be the same, on average. For each can of powder, the density will be the same.

The volume required to for a charge is the density of the powder multiplied by the weight of the charge.

There are powders that take small charges, some take larger. For example, the Hodgdon recipe for 45ACp says that IMR Blue can be used with a starting charge of 9.0 grains. They also say that you can use Clays with a starting charge of 3.7grains.

There is only a 0.3grain difference between the starting charge and maximum charge when using Clays. This is not a lot of room for error.

There is a bit more range for IMR Blue. Regardless, the point of this is to let you know that we are measuring small values accurately and repeatably.
Read More