As Americans, we have every reason to celebrate our rights and freedoms, especially on Independence Day. Can the senseless crimes of a relative few be so despicable to justify the infringement of the constitutional rights of law-abiding individuals in hopes that such crimes will then abate or, at least, not be as horrific? More specifically, can PICA be harmonized with the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and with Bruen? That is the issue before this Court. The simple answer at this stage in the proceedings is “likely no.” The Supreme Court in Bruen and Heller held that citizens have a constitutional right to own and possess firearms and may use them for self-defense. PICA seems to be written in spite of the clear directives in Bruen and Heller, not in conformity with them. Whether well-intentioned, brilliant, or arrogant, no state may enact a law that denies its citizens rights that the Constitution guarantees them. Even legislation that may enjoy the support of a majority of its citizens must fail if it violates the constitutional rights of fellow citizens. For the reasons fully set out below, the overly broad reach of PICA commands that the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs be granted.
—National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo, No. 22-842, slip op. at 20 (May 30, 2024)
Some compelling prose from Judge McGlynn, District Court Judge, S.D. Ill. He gets it.
He does the right thing and grants the preliminary injunction. The state runs to mommy, the Seventh Circuit court.
There, Woods and Easterbrook make a mockery of judicial decorum, judicial precedents, and show their utter disrespect for the Supreme Court. They decided that icky guns aren’t arms under the Second Amendment, so there was no infringement.
As the Amici said in United States v. Kittson
The parties and the lower court mischaracterized
Bruen as requiring a two-step analysis. Appellant’s. Br. (“AB”) at 35; 1-ER-46-47. Unfortunately, lower courts and reviewing courts have been similarly mischaracterizing the breadth and application of
Bruen’s analysis, to the point that the myth of a two-step analysis has become pervasive, including in this Circuit. See
United States v. Alaniz, 69 F.4th 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2023) (asserting that
Bruen abrogated one two-step test but then adopted another); see also
United States v. Duarte, No. 22-50048, 2024 WL 2068016, at *4 (9th Cir. May 9, 2024) (also erroneously applying the new two-step test). This panel should use this opportunity to correct this error.
By its plain language, Bruen eschews a two-step test and calls for a one-step test: “Despite the popularity of th[e] two-step approach, it is one step too many.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19. It would make little sense for the Court to expressly abrogate a step as unnecessary only to then reinsert a substitute.
Because the district court fundamentally misunderstood the approach Bruen requires, this case provides an excellent opportunity for this Court to clarify that the simple requirement that a Second Amendment case implicate the right to keep or bear arms is not a significant analytical “step,” and thus, as the district courts and other courts have transmuted it, an imposing hurdle. Rather, it is a simple qualifier. This is critical because courts have cynically transformed this manufactured first step into a barrier relieving the government of its burden of the historical analysis altogether, unfairly shifting burdens from the government to civil plaintiffs (or criminal defendants), and reinserting the interest balancing derided and forbade by Bruen under the guise of a purported “plain text” analysis that allows lower courts like this one to treat obvious arms-related questions as though they are not.
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